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Uncertainty in various forms plagues our interactions
with the environment. In a Bayesian statistical frame-
work, optimal inference and prediction, based on un-
reliable observations in changing contexts, require
the representation and manipulation of different
forms of uncertainty. We propose that the neuro-
modulators acetylcholine and norepinephrine play a
major role in the brain’s implementation of these un-
certainty computations. Acetylcholine signals ex-
pected uncertainty, coming from known unreliability
of predictive cues within a context. Norepinephrine
signals unexpected uncertainty, as when unsignaled
context switches produce strongly unexpected ob-
servations. These uncertainty signals interact to en-
able optimal inference and learning in noisy and
changeable environments. This formulation is consis-
tent with a wealth of physiological, pharmacological,
and behavioral data implicating acetylcholine and
norepinephrine in specific aspects of a range of cog-
nitive processes. Moreover, the model suggests a
class of attentional cueing tasks that involve both
neuromodulators and shows how their interactions
may be part-antagonistic, part-synergistic.
Introduction
Making inferences about the state of the world and pre-
dictions about the future based on many different kinds
of uncertain information sources is one of the most fun-
damental computational tasks facing the brain. Doing
so successfully requires explicit handling of the uncer-
tainties. Bayesian statistical theory frames this problem
quantitatively and has been successfully applied to
cognitive phenomena in perception (Clark and Yuille,
1990; Knill and Richards, 1996; Ernst and Banks, 2002;
Battaglia et al., 2003), attention (Dayan et al., 2000; Yu
and Dayan, 2002; Dayan and Yu, 2003), and sensorimo-
tor learning (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). For our pur-
poses, the Bayesian framework formalizes the notion
that optimal inference and learning depend critically on
representing and processing the various sorts of uncer-
tainty associated with a behavioral context. A context
consists of a set of stable statistical regularities that
relate the myriad environmental entities, such as ob-
jects and events, to each other and to our sensory and
motor systems. These correlational relationships (e.g.,
event X rarely co-occurs with event Y, or action A ap-
plied to object O is frequently followed by event C) al-*Correspondence: feraina@gatsby.ucl.ac.uklow inferences to be made about imperfectly observed
aspects of the environment (either in space or time)
based on prior observations, which serve as predictive
cues. According to Bayesian statistical theory, uncer-
tainty about the behavioral context should suppress the
use of assumed cues for making inferences (compared
with direct sensory information), but boost learning
about the lesser known predictive relationships within
the current behavioral context (Yu and Dayan, 2003).
Every information source can be associated with un-
certainty that can be described as being either ex-
pected or unexpected from the perspective of the
subject. Expected uncertainty arises from known unre-
liability of predictive relationships within a familiar envi-
ronment, and unexpected uncertainty is induced by
gross changes in the environment that produce sensory
observations strongly violating top-down expectations.
For instance, the “simple” decision of whether to bring
an umbrella in the morning entails the careful consider-
ation of various potentially conflicting sources of infor-
mation, such as the forecast from the weather station
and the ominousness of the cloud formation. For some-
one who regularly views the weather forecast, the typi-
cal chance of a misforecast constitutes a form of “ex-
pected uncertainty,” while a substantial drop in forecast
reliability, perhaps due to the onset of “el niño,” would
induce “unexpected uncertainty” and possibly encour-
age the viewer to base weather predictions on other
information sources.
What should we expect of the neural realization of
expected and unexpected uncertainty signals? First,
both should have the effect of suppressing top-down,
expectation-driven information relative to bottom-up,
sensory-induced signals, as well as promoting learning
about the context. Second, they should be selectively
involved in tasks engaging just one or the other form of
uncertainty. A considerable body of experimental evi-
dence suggests that the cholinergic and noradrenergic
systems satisfy these conditions (Robbins and Everitt,
1995; Posner and Petersen, 1990; Sarter and Bruno,
1997; Baxter and Chiba, 1999; Gu, 2002), with acetyl-
choline (ACh) being involved in expected uncertainty
and norepinephrine (NE) in unexpected uncertainty.
Across primary sensory cortices, ACh and NE selec-
tively suppress intracortical and feedback synaptic
transmission, while sparing, or even boosting, thalamo-
cortical processing (Gil et al., 1997; Hasselmo et al.,
1996; Hsieh et al., 2000; Kimura et al., 1999; Kobayashi,
2000). This suggests that higher ACh and NE levels lead
to a suppression of top-down sources in the balance
between top-down and bottom-up information inte-
gration. ACh and NE also play a synergistic and permis-
sive role in experience-dependent plasticity in the neo-
cortex and the hippocampus (reviewed in Gu, 2002),
allowing revision of internal representations based on
new experiences. ACh and NE depletions have been
observed to suppress experience-dependent plasticity
(Bear and Singer, 1986; Baskerville et al., 1997; Levin et
al., 1988), and experimental increases of ACh and NE
induce cortical reorganization when paired with sen-
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gard and Merzenich, 1998; Greuel et al., 1988; Ego-
Stengel et al., 2001; but also see Ego-Stengel et al.,
2002).
In addition to these common cortical effects, evi-
dence from two different classical attentional para-
digms suggests that ACh and NE play distinct func-
tional roles. The first paradigm is probabilistic cueing,
as exemplified by the Posner task, in which a cue ex-
plicitly predicts the location of a subsequent target with
a certain probability (termed cue validity). In this task,
subjects process the target stimuli more rapidly and ac-
curately on correctly cued (valid cue) trials than on in-
correctly cued (invalid cue) trials, and the difference
(termed validity effect, VE) increases with cue validity
(Bowman et al., 1993; Downing, 1988). The invalidity of
the cue (probability of the cue being incorrect) parame-
terizes the stochasticity of the task and is typically con-
stant over a whole experimental session. Therefore, it
Fis well known to the subjects and a form of expected
C
uncertainty. The observation that VE varies inversely
(with the level of ACh is consistent with our theoretical
l
notion that ACh reports expected uncertainty (cue in- c
validity) and thus suppresses the use of the cue. This a
has been observed in rodents and primates with phar- q
tmacological (Phillips et al., 2000; Witte et al., 1997) and
lsurgical (Voytko et al., 1994; Chiba et al., 1999) manipu-
(lations of the level of ACh release, Alzheimer’s disease
c
patients (Parasuraman et al., 1992) with characteristic c
cholinergic depletions (Whitehouse et al., 1982), and γ
smokers after nicotine (an ACh agonist) consumption
(Witte et al., 1997).
NE, in contrast to ACh, does not consistently interact s
with the probabilistic cueing task after initial acquisition u
(Witte and Marrocco, 1997; Clark et al., 1989). Instead, m
it appears to play an important role in a second para- c
digm, namely attention-shifting tasks. In these tasks, o
the predictive properties of sensory stimuli are deliber- W
ately changed by the experimenter without warning, in m
order to study how subjects shift and refocus attention m
between sensory cues and adapt to new predictive re-
lationships. An example is the linear maze navigation Rtask, in which rats undergo an unexpected shift from
spatial to visual cues that indicate which route they
Fmust take in order to proceed from one end of the maze
ito the other (Devauges and Sara, 1990). Boosting NE
awith the drug idazoxan (Curet et al., 1987) in this task
uaccelerates the detection of the cue-shift and learning
sof the new cues (Devauges and Sara, 1990). This is con-
(sistent with our proposal that NE is involved in report-
ting the unexpected uncertainty arising from dramatic
achanges in the cue-target relationship and that this in-
Tcreased NE release in turn boosts learning. In a related
iattention-shifting task that is formally equivalent to
tthose used in monkeys and humans (Birrell and Brown,
t2000), cortical noradrenergic (but not cholinergic)
alesions impair the shift of attention from one type of
idiscriminative stimulus to another (Eichenbaum, Ross,
(Raji, and McGaughy, 2003, Soc. Neurosci., abstract
p29, 940.7).
aThese tasks selectively engage expected or unex-
opected uncertainty and selectively involve ACh or NE,
Hrespectively. Here, we suggest a task that generalizes
the Posner task and the attention-shifting task and bhould therefore involve both forms of uncertainty. We
se this task to interpret a rich body of existing experi-
ental data in a unifying framework and to make spe-
ific, testable predictions with respect to the responses
f ACh and NE systems at different stages of the task.
e also predict the effects on psychophysical perfor-
ance of interference with one or both of these neuro-
odulators.
esults
igure 1 shows the task that we use to motivate and
llustrate our theory. While other paradigms might equ-
lly well have been adapted, we focus here on a partic-
lar extension of the Posner task. Subjects observe a
equence of trials, each containing a set of cue stimuli
the colored arrows, pointing left or right) preceding a
arget stimulus (the light bulb) after a variable delay,
nd must respond as soon as they detect the target.
he directions of the colored arrows are randomized
ndependently of each other on every trial, but one of
hem, the cue, specified by its color, predicts the loca-
ion of the subsequent target with a significant prob-
bility (cue validity γ > 0.5), the rest of the arrows are
rrelevant distractors. On each trial, the cue is correct
valid) with probability γ, and incorrect (invalid) with
robability 1 − γ (cue invalidity). The color of the cue
rrow (the “relevant” color) and the cue validity persist
ver many trials, defining a relatively stable context.
owever, the experimenter can suddenly change the
ehavioral context by changing the relevant cue colorigure 1. Example of an Extended Posner Task Involving Differently
olored Cue Stimuli
1) red, (2) green, (3) blue, (4) purple, (5) yellow. This is just for il-
ustrative purposes—experimental concerns have been omitted for
larity. Each trial consists of a cue frame followed by a target frame
fter a variable delay. The subject must report the target onset as
uickly as possible. The first block has T − 1 trials, during which
he blue arrow predicts the target location with a constant cue va-
idity (γ1 = … = γT−1), and the arrows of all other colors are irrelevant
each on average points toward the target on half of the trials by
hance). In the second block, starting on trial T, the red arrow be-
omes the predictive cue, but with a different cue validity γT =
T+1 = ….
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subjects’ implicit probabilistic task on each trial is to
predict the likelihood of the target appearing on the left
versus on the right given the set of cue stimuli on that
trial. Doing this correctly requires them to infer the iden-
tity (color) of the currently relevant arrow and estimate
its validity. In turn, they must accurately detect the in-
frequent and unsignaled switches in the cue identity
(and the context).
This task generalizes probabilistic cueing tasks,
which typically have a predictive cue with fixed identity,
but whose validity is explicitly manipulated. The task
also generalizes attention-shifting tasks, for which the
identity of the relevant cue stimulus is experimentally
manipulated, but whose validity is fixed at being per-
fectly correct. In this generalized task, unsignaled
changes in the cue identity result in observations about
the cue and target that are atypical for the learned be-
havioral context. They give rise to unexpected uncer-
tainty and should therefore engage NE. Within each
context, the cue has a fixed invalidity, which would give
rise to expected uncertainty and should therefore en-
gage ACh.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the cue-target
contingency in this generalized task, achieving these
computational goals is difficult due to the noise and
nonstationarity underlying the cue-target relationship.
In fact, the mathematically optimal ideal learner algo-
rithm imposes such high computational and represen-
tational costs that its exact implementation is bio-
logically impractical (see Experimental Procedures).
Nevertheless, the brain seems quite capable of solving
similar and much more difficult problems. Therefore, we
propose that the brain may be implementing an alterna-
tive algorithm (sketched in Figure 2) that approximates
the ideal one. Full details are provided in the Experi-
mental Procedures section, along with a discussion ofFigure 2. Schematic of the Inference Method
ACh and NE report expected and unexpected uncertainty and
jointly control the balance between top-down and bottom-up infor-
mation processing in cortical inference and learning. The statistical
contingencies in the combined attention task are captured in a
common framework. On trial t, one single cue color (among the
many) is actually predictive of target location. ACh reports the esti-
mated invalidity of the presumed cue; NE reports on the uncertainty
associated with the identity (i.e., color) of the informative cue.the circumstances under which the performance of the
approximate algorithm closely tracks that of the (bio-
logically impractical) ideal learner.
Specifically, the approximation we propose bases all
estimates on just a single assumed relevant cue color,
rather than maintaining the full probability distribution
over all potential cue colors. NE reports the estimated
lack of confidence as to the particular color that is cur-
rently believed to be relevant. This signal is driven by
any unexpected cue-target observations on recent tri-
als and is the signal implicated in controlling learning
following cue shift in the maze navigation task (De-
vauges and Sara, 1990). ACh reports the estimated in-
validity of the color that is assumed to be relevant and
is the signal implicated in controlling VE in the standard
Posner task (Phillips et al., 2000). These two sources of
uncertainty cooperate to determine how the subjects
perform the trial-by-trial prediction task of estimating
the likelihood that the target will appear on the left ver-
sus the right. Either form of uncertainty should reduce
the attention paid to the target location predicted by
the assumed cue, since it reduces the degree to which
that cue can be trusted. VE in our model is therefore
assumed to be proportional to (1 − ACh) (1 − NE),
though other formulations inversely related to each
type of the uncertainties signaled by ACh and NE would
produce qualitatively similar results. This is consistent
with the observed ability of both ACh and NE to sup-
press top-down, intracortical information (associated
with the cue), relative to bottom-up, input-driven sen-
sory processing (associated with the target) (Gil et al.,
1997; Hasselmo et al., 1996; Hsieh et al., 2000; Kimura
et al., 1999; Kobayashi, 2000).
In addition to the uncertainties signaled by ACh and
NE, two other pieces of information are necessary for
the appropriate updating of the internal model after
each cue-target observation. One is the color of the cue
that is currently assumed to be relevant, which is criti-
cal for predicting target locations. The other is the esti-
mate of the number of trials in the current context
(since this color first became relevant), which controls
how much the estimated cue validity is influenced by
the outcome of a single trial. More details about these
quantities, and their roles in the approximate algorithm,
can be found in the Experimental Procedures. We sug-
gest that these two quantities are represented and up-
dated in the prefrontal working memory (Miller and Co-
hen, 2001). This cortical region has dense reciprocal
connections with both the cholinergic (Sarter and
Bruno, 1997; Zaborszky et al., 1997; Hasselmo and
Schnell, 1994) and noradrenergic (Sara and Hervé-Min-
vielle, 1995; Jodo et al., 1998) nuclei, in addition to the
sensory processing areas, making it well suited to the
integration and updating of the various quantities.
Figures 3 and 4 show comparisons between experi-
mental and simulated data for the specific renditions of
Posner’s task and the maze navigation task, which we
discussed above. We model the Posner task (Phillips
et al., 2000) as a restricted version of the general task,
for which the identity of the relevant color does not
change and the cue validity is fixed. The iterative algo-
rithm described in Experimental Procedures computes
expected and unexpected uncertainties and thereby
























cFigure 3. The Posner Task and Cholinergic Modulation
tValidity effect is the difference in reaction time between invalidly
and validly cued trials. (A) Systemic administration of nicotine de- p
creases VE in a dose-dependent manner. (B) Systemic administra-
tion of scopolamine increases VE in a dose-dependent manner. a
Even though the baselines for the two control groups (with drug
econcentration equal to 0) in (A) and (B) are not well-matched, the
kopposite and dose-dependent effects of the bidirectional manipu-
dlations are clear. VE is measured in milliseconds. (A) and (B) are
adapted from Phillips et al., 2000, with kind permission of Springer t
Science and Business Media. (C and D) Simulation results replicate i
these trends qualitatively. Error bars: standard errors of the mean B
over 1000 trials.
d
aWithin our theoretical framework, such a task explicitly This inequality points to an antagonistic relationship
Figure 4. A Maze Navigation Task and the Ef-
fects of Boosting NE
(A) The cumulative percentage of idazoxan
rats reaching criterion (making no more than
one error on 2 consecutive days) consider-
ably outpaced that of the saline-control group.
Adapted from Devauges and Sara (1990)
with permission from Elsevier.
(B) In the model, simulated “rats” with ele-
vated NE levels (10% greater than normal)
also learn the strategy shift considerably
faster than controls. Data averaged over 20
simulated experiments of 30 model rats
each: 15 NE-enhanced, 15 controls. Error
bars: standard errors of the mean.duncertainty, NE is not explicitly involved, and so nora-
hdrenergic manipulation is incapable of interfering with
mperformance in this task. This is consistent with experi-
cmental observations (Witte and Marrocco, 1997). How-
tever, ACh captures the invalidity of the cue, and so, as
tin the experimental data (Figures 3A and 3B), VE de-
dpends inversely on boosting (Figure 3C) or suppressing
t(Figure 3D) ACh.
In contrast to the Posner task, which involves no un-
expected uncertainty, the attention-shifting task in-
volves unexpected, but not expected, uncertainty.anipulates the identity of the relevant cue, while the
ue validity is kept constant (with high validity). Experi-
entally enhancing NE levels (Devauges and Sara,
990) results in greater unexpected uncertainty and
herefore a greater readiness to abandon the current
ypothesis and adopt a new model for environmental
ontingencies (Figure 4A). Simulations of our model
how a similar advantage for the group with NE levels
levated to 10% above normal (Figure 4B). Our model
ould also predict a lack of ACh involvement, since the
erfect reliability of the cues obviates a role for ex-
ected uncertainty, consistent with experimental data
Eichenbaum, Ross, Raji, and McGaughy, 2003, Soc.
eurosci, abstract 29, 940.7).
These results do not imply that increasing NE creates
nimals that learn faster in general. In the model, con-
rol animals are relatively slow in switching to a new
isual strategy because their performance embodies an
ssumption (which is normally correct) that task contin-
encies do not easily change. Pharmacologically in-
reasing NE counteracts the conservative character of
his internal model, allowing idazoxan animals to learn
aster than the control animals under these particular
ircumstances. The extra propensity of the NE group
o consider that the task has changed can impair their
erformance in other circumstances.
In the generalized task of Figure 1, both cue identity
nd validity are explicitly manipulated, and therefore we
xpect both ACh and NE to play significant roles. The
ey to solving the full task is the timely and accurate
etection of context changes in the face of invalidity. A
rial perceived to be valid always increases confidence
n the current context, as well as estimated cue validity.
ut when a trial is apparently invalid, subjects have to
ecide between maintaining the current context with
n increased invalidity or abandoning it altogether. This
ecision requires comparing the relative probability of
aving observed a chance invalid trial given the esti-
ated cue validity and the probability of the predictive
ue identity having changed altogether. As ACh reports
he first probability and NE the second, we can expect
here to be a rich interaction between these neuromo-
ulators. In the Experimental Procedures, we show that
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685between ACh and NE: the threshold for NE that deter-
mines whether or not the context should be assumed
to have changed is set monotonically by the level of
ACh. Intuitively, when the estimated cue invalidity is
low, a single observation of a mismatch between cue
and target could signal a context switch. But when the
estimated cue invalidity is high, indicating low correla-
tion between cue and target, then a single mismatch
would be more likely to be treated as an invalid trial
rather than a context switch. This antagonistic relation-
ship between ACh and NE in the learning of the cue-
target relationship over trials contrasts with their chiefly
synergistic relationship in the prediction of the target
location on each trial.
Figure 5A shows a typical run in the full task that
uses differently colored cue stimuli. The predictive cue
stimulus is  = 1 for the first 200 trials,  = 5 for the
next 200, and  = 3 for the final 200. The approximate
algorithm does a good job of tracking the underlying
contextual sequence from the noisy observations. The
black dashed line (labeled 1 − γ) in Figure 5B shows
the cue invalidities of 1%, 30%, and 15% for the three
contexts. Simulated ACh levels (dashed red trace in
Figure 5B) approach these values in each context. The
corresponding simulated NE levels (solid green trace in
Figure 5B) show that NE generally correctly reports a
contextual change when one occurs, though occasion-
ally a false alarm can be triggered by a chance accumu-
lation of unexpected observations, which takes place
most frequently when the true cue validity is low. These
traces directly give rise to physiological predictions re-
garding ACh and NE activations, which could be exper-
imentally verified. Psychophysical predictions can alsoFigure 5. Typical Run of the Approximate In-
ference Algorithm on the Generalized Atten-
tion Task Involving Both Expected and Unex-
pected Uncertainties
(A) Tracking of cue identity. The true underly-
ing context variable  (in black stars) indi-
cates which one of the h=5 colored cue stim-
uli is actually predictive of the target
location:  = 1 for the first 200 trials,  = 5
for the next 200, and  = 3 for the final 200.
The true  is closely tracked by the esti-
mated * (in magenta circles, mostly over-
lapping the black stars). The blue dots indi-
cate “null” trials on which the algorithm has
detected a context change but has yet to
come up with a new hypothesis for the pre-
dictive cue among the h possible cue stimuli.
Here, it takes place for ten trials subsequent
to every detected context switch (see Exper-
imental Procedures).
(B) Tracking of cue validity. The black dashed
line is 1 − γ, indicating the true cue invalidity:
1 − γ is 0.01 for the first 200 trials, 1 − γ = 0.3
for the next 200, and 1 − γ = 0.15 for the final
200. Higher values of 1 − γ result in noisier
observations. The red trace indicates the
level of ACh, reporting 1 − γ*, or the estimated probability of invalid cueing in the model. It closely tracks the true value of 1 − γ. The green
trace indicates the level of NE, reporting on the approximate algorithm’s model uncertainty 1 − γ*. It surges when there is a context change
or a chance accumulation of consecutive deviation trials, but is low otherwise.
(C) Predicted validity effect (VE), measured as either the difference in accuracy or reaction time between valid and invalid trials. Modeled as
proportional to the total confidence in the predictive power of the cue, which depends on both types of uncertainty, VE varies inversely with
both ACh and NE levels: VE = (1 − ACh)(1 − NE). It is low whenever NE signals a context change, and its more tonic values in different
contexts vary inversely with the ACh signal and therefore the cue invalidity.be derived from the model. The validity effect is pre-
dicted to exhibit the characteristic pattern shown in
Figure 5C, where large transients are mostly dependent
on NE activities, while tonic values are more deter-
mined by ACh levels. During the task, there is a strong
dip in VE just after each contextual change, arising from
a drop in model confidence. The asymptotic VE within
a context, on the other hand, converges to a level that
is proportional to the expected probability of valid cues.
It follows from Equation 1 and the related discussion
above that ACh and NE interact critically to help con-
struct appropriate cortical representations and make
correct inferences. Thus, simulated experimental inter-
ference with one or both neuromodulatory systems
should result in an intricate pattern of impairments. Fig-
ure 6 shows the effects of depleting NE (Figures 6A and
6B), ACh (Figures 6C and 6D), and both ACh and NE
(Figures 6E and 6F) on the same example session as
in Figure 5. NE depletion results in the model having
excessive confidence in the current cue-target relation-
ship. This leads to perseverative behavior and an im-
pairment in the ability to adapt to environmental
changes, which are also observed in animals with ex-
perimentally reduced NE levels (Sara, 1998). In addition,
the model makes the prediction that this reluctance to
adapt to new environments would make the ACh level,
which reports expected uncertainty, gradually rise to
take into account all the accumulating evidence of de-
viation from the current model. Conversely, suppress-
ing ACh leads the model to underestimate the amount
of variation in a given context. Consequently, the signi-
ficance of deviations from the primary location is exag-
gerated, causing the NE system to overreact and lead
Neuron
686Figure 6. Simulating Pharmacological Deple-
tions
Same sequence of cue-target inputs as in
Figure 5. (A, C, and E) Same convention as
in Figure 5A; (B, D, and F) same as in Figure
5B. (A) 50% NE depletion leads to excessive
confidence in the model and results in a per-
severative tendency to ignore contextual
changes, as evidenced by the delayed de-
tection of a cue identity switch between the
first and second blocks of 200 trials, and
the lack of response to the switch between
the second and third blocks. (B) Substantial
underactivation of NE, especially during the
second and third blocks. ACh level rises
gradually in the third block to incorporate the
rising number of unexpected observations
(with respect to the presumed relevant cue
identity being 5) due to NE dysfunctions. (C)
50% ACh depletion leads to an overestima-
tion of the cue validity, thus exaggerating the
significance of any invalid trial, resulting in
a pattern of “hyperdistractibility.” (D) ACh
levels are abnormally low; the NE system be-
comes hyperactive. (E) Combined 50% de-
pletion of ACh and 50% of NE leads to less
impairment than single depletion of either
NE or ACh. (F) However, compared with the
control case, ACh no longer accurately
tracks cue invalidity, and NE detects far
more apparent false alarms.to frequent and unnecessary alerts of context switches. a
bOverall, the system exhibits symptoms of “hyper-
distractibility,” reminiscent of empirical observations 1
Dthat anticholinergic drugs enhance distractibility (Jones
and Higgins, 1995) while agonists suppress it (Prender- n
Ngast et al., 1998; Terry et al., 2002; O’Neill et al., 2003).
Finally, the most interesting impairments come from
simulated joint depletion of ACh and NE. Figures 6E D
and 6F show that, compared to the intact case of Figure
5, combined ACh and NE depletion leads to inaccurate O
scholinergic tracking of cue invalidity and a significant
increase in false alarms about contextual changes. c
aHowever, it is also apparent, by comparison with Fig-
ures 6A and 6C, that combined depletion of ACh and a
1NE can actually lead to less severe impairments than
either single depletion. Figure 7 shows this in a system- a
tatic comparison of combined depletions with single
ACh and NE depletions, where ACh level is severely W
odepressed, and NE suppression is varied parametri-
cally from very depleted to normal levels. Intermediate a
tvalues of NE depletion, combined with ACh depletion,
induce impairments that are significantly less severe e
wthan either single manipulation.
Intuitively, since ACh sets the threshold for NE- t
wdependent contextual change (Equation 1), abnormal
suppression of either system can be partially alleviated c
iby directly inhibiting the other. Due to this antagonism,
depleting the ACh level in the model has somewhat p
tsimilar effects to enhancing NE; and depleting NE is
similar to enhancing ACh. Intriguingly, Sara and col- o
cleagues have found similarly antagonistic interactions
between ACh and NE in a series of learning and mem- t
eory studies (Sara, 1989; Ammassari-Teule et al., 1991;
Sara et al., 1992; Dyon-Laurent et al., 1993; Dyon- t
NLaurent et al., 1994). They demonstrated that learningnd memory deficits caused by cholinergic lesions can
e alleviated by the administration of clonidine (Sara,
989; Ammassari-Teule et al., 1991; Sara et al., 1992;
yon-Laurent et al., 1993; Dyon-Laurent et al., 1994), a
oradrenergic α-2 agonist that decreases the level of
E (Coull et al., 1997).
iscussion
ur theoretical ideas about ACh and NE as uncertainty
ignals are related to and inspired by previous theoreti-
al works on neuromodulation, notably Hasselmo et
l.’s theory about cholinergic control of hippocampal
nd cortical dynamics and plasticity (Hasselmo et al.,
996; Hasselmo, 1999) and Grossberg et al.’s theory
bout neuromodulatory control of cortical representa-
ion and adaptation (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991).
hile there are conceptual and mechanistic similarities,
ur theory differs in its fundamentally statistical nature
nd the explicit and cooperative roles it assigns to
hese neuromodulators in controlling predictive infer-
nce and learning within this statistical framework. Our
ork is also related to an earlier theoretical account of
he role NE plays in attention (Usher et al., 1999). That
ork gave NE a gating role in regulating sensory pro-
essing and neural decision making, similar to the
ntermediary role we propose for NE in balancing the
rocessing of feedforward sensory information and
op-down attentional biases. Moreover, its designation
f tonic NE as being associated with exploration is
losely related to our characterization of NE as a detec-
ion and alerting signal for contextual changes. How-
ver, our underlying statistical model is different, as are
he synergistic and antagonistic interactions between
E and ACh.
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687Figure 7. Combined ACh and NE Depletions Ameliorate Impair-
ments from Single Depletions
Black trace indicates the average predictive coding cost for the
intact algorithm, red trace for severe cholinergic depletion to 1%
of normal levels (and intact NE system), and green trace for NE
depletion at various percentages of normal levels (and intact ACh
system). Predictive coding cost is defined as ,
where ° is the true value of the contextual variable  in each trial,
Dt h {c1, S1,…, ct, St} is all cue-target observed so far,
is the dynamic prior probability accorded to by the approximate
algorithm, given all previous cue-target pair observations, and CD
denotes the expectation taken over trials. This assigns high costs
to predicting a small probability for the true upcoming context. The
impairments are largest for very small levels of NE, which lead to
severe perseveration. Combining ACh and NE depletions actually
leads to performance that is better than that for either single deple-
tion. For intermediate values of NE depletion, performance even
approaches that of the intact case. Error bars: standard errors of
the mean, averaged over 30 sessions of 600 trials each for the
green and blue traces. Standard errors of the mean, averaged over
330 sessions of 600 trials each, are very small for the red and black
traces (less than the thickness of the lines; not shown). Self-transi-
tion probability of the contextual variable is set to τ = 0.995.Our work is rather farther removed from various ge-
neric ideas about ACh and NE, such as their role in
controlling the signal-to-noise ratio of sensory process-
ing (Hasselmo et al., 1997; Gu, 2002; Hurley et al.,
2004). Instead of treating background activity as purely
noise, we expect that neuronal activity indirectly related
to sensory stimulation is likely to provide information
about the overall context and internal assumptions and
expectations. ACh and NE modulation of these activi-
ties should therefore be based on sound reasons for
ignoring the internal model rather than being merely a
blanket suppression. These more generic ideas do not
address the pattern of results in the Posner task and
the attention-shifting task, nor do they suggest a con-
crete framework for understanding the interaction of
the neuromodulators.
There is also a distinct component of NE signaling on
a faster time scale (Rajkowski et al., 1994; Rajkowski et
al., 2004; Clayton et al., 2004; Bouret and Sara, 2004),
which has been proposed to be associated with the
balance between exploration and exploitation (Usher et
al., 1999; Doya, 2002) and has recently been analyzedin probabilistic terms of regulating decision-making
networks (Brown et al., 2005). While we do not treat this
phasic NE explicitly here, we argue elsewhere (P.D. and
A.J.Y., unpublished data) that phasic NE signals unex-
pected uncertainty about state change within a behav-
ioral context as a form of interrupt signal.
While we have illustrated our model using a specific
implementation that extends the classical Posner para-
digm, the key concepts could be equivalently realized
by modifying a number of other familiar attention tasks,
such as allowing the cue validity to vary in an attention-
shifting task. There is also a rich background of experi-
mental data consistent with our uncertainty theory of
ACh and NE, which lie outside traditional attentional
tasks. For instance, the enhanced learning animals ac-
cord to stimuli with uncertain predictive consequences
(Bucci et al., 1998) and decreased learning they accord
to stimuli with well-known consequences (Baxter et al.,
1997) in conditioning tasks (Pearce and Hall, 1980) are
critically dependent on the ACh system. Also, record-
ings of neurons in the locus coeruleus, the source of
cortical NE, indicate strong responses to unexpected
external changes such as novelty, introduction of rein-
forcement pairing, and extinction or reversal of these
contingencies (Sara and Segal, 1991; Vankov et al.,
1995; Sara et al., 1994; Aston-Jones et al., 1997). NE
has also been observed to modulate the P300 compo-
nent of ERP (Pineda et al., 1997; Missonnier et al., 1999;
Turetsky and Fein, 2002), which has been associated
with various types of violation of expectations: “sur-
prise” (Verleger et al., 1994), “novelty” (Donchin et al.,
1978), and “oddball” detection (Pineda et al., 1997).
These data reinforce the idea that NE reports unex-
pected global changes in the external environment and
thus serves as an alarm system for contextual switches.
In addition, the well-documented ability of ACh and NE
to control experience-dependent plasticity in the cortex
(Gu, 2002) is consistent with their proposed ability to
alter sensory processing in a fundamental manner,
upon detection of a global contextual change.
Although our model successfully accounts for ACh
and NE involvement in the range of attentional tasks
considered, there are both theoretical and empirical
subtleties that merit further exploration. From a theoret-
ical point of view, the line between expected and unex-
pected uncertainty is rather blurred. Crudely, uncer-
tainty is unexpected when it cannot be predicted from
a model. It is often the case, however, that more sophis-
ticated models (sometimes called metamodels) can be
constructed which capture uncertainties about uncer-
tainties. Thus, with increased exposure to a particular
behavioral context and ever more complex internal
models, unexpected uncertainties can often be ren-
dered expected. However, at any point in the learning
and execution of a task, some kinds of variabilities are
always more unexpected than others. It is the relatively
more unexpected uncertainties that we expect to de-
pend on NE.
Another issue is that we have used the ACh signal to
report both expected uncertainty arising from igno-
rance (which generally reduces as experience accumu-
lates) and expected uncertainty arising from inherent
stochasticity in the task (which cannot be reduced
through experience). Although this is partly motivated
Neuron
688Figure 8. Approximate versus Exact (Ideal)
Inference/Learning
The ideal learner (exact) algorithm is simu-
lated by discretizing the continuous space of
the hidden parameter γ into finely spaced
bins. The approximate algorithm uses ACh
and NE signals as detailed in the Experimen-
tal Procedures section. The predictive cod-
ing cost is , as defined in Fig-
ure 7. The approximate algorithm does much
better than the bottom-up algorithm for
larger values of γ. Error bars: every session
contains one block of 500 trials for each γ
value, with random ordering of the blocks;
standard errors of the mean are averaged
over 40 such sessions for each γ. Self-transi-
tion probability of  is τ = 0.998. Total num-
ber of cue stimuli is h=5.by evidence from conditioning studies (Kaye and o
pPearce, 1984; Bucci et al., 1998; Baxter et al., 1997),
these two forms of expected uncertainty play rather dif- o
fferent theoretical roles, and it would be interesting to
consider tasks that cleanly separate them and examine a
Bthe involvement of ACh there.
Furthermore, in richer tasks necessitating complex o
and hierarchical internal representations, subjects can
simultaneously suffer from different expected uncer- t
stainties about different aspects of the context, unlike
the single form considered in our model. From a neuro- s
sbiological point of view, it is important to consider the
specificity and complexity of the sources and targets r
tof cholinergic and noradrenergic signaling. Anatomical
and electrophysiological studies suggest that choliner- o
tgic neurons in the nucleus basalis, the main source of
cortical ACh, have heterogeneous behaviors (Gu, 2002), c
fand individual neurons can have high topographical
specificity in their projection to functionally distinct but P
arelated cortical areas (Zaborszky, 2002) (also see Raza,
Csordas, Hoffer, Alloway, and Zaborszky, 2003, Soc. g
sNeurosci. abstract 29, 585.12). Thus, the corticopetal
cholinergic system may be able to support simulta- c
sneous monitoring and reporting of uncertainty about
many quantities. In contrast, the activity of NE neurons t
tin the locus coeruleus has been observed to be more
homogeneous (Aston-Jones and Bloom, 1981). This, t
otogether with existing ideas on a role for NE in global
alertness and novelty detection, makes NE more appro- e
opriate as the sort of global model failure signal that we
have employed. More importantly, cortical neuronal p
populations may encode rich forms of uncertainty
Ethemselves (Anderson, 1995; Pouget et al., 2000; Pouget
et al., 2003), which necessarily interact with the neuro-
Wmodulatory uncertainty signals. This could significantly
t
augment the brain’s overall capacity to represent and f
compute in the face of equivocation. Elsewhere (Yu and l
Dayan, 2005), we have suggested one scheme of divi- P
csion of labor for cortical and neuromodulatory uncer-
itainties in sensory processing. Understanding the
pspecificity and complexity of neural representations of
uncertainty is an important direction for future empirical
Tas well as theoretical studies.
O
Despite a measure of generality, our theory of ACh c
and NE in probabilistic attention and learning is clearly l
dnot a comprehensive theory of either neuromodulationr attention. For instance, there are established as-
ects of ACh and NE functions, such as their regulation
f wake-sleep cycles, theta oscillation, autonomic
unctions, as well as certain aspects of attention, such
s saliency and alertness, that lack a straightforward
ayesian probabilistic interpretation along the lines of
ur model.
The most concrete predictions of our theory concern
he extension of the Posner task (or the related exten-
ion of the attention-shifting task). The model makes
pecific predictions with respect to the trial-to-trial re-
ponses of ACh and NE neurons in electrophysiological
ecordings, provides quantitative regressors for func-
ional imaging studies in order to discover the network
f cortical areas that represent and compute uncertain-
ies, as well as making predictions about psychophysi-
al measures (e.g., reaction times and accuracy) as a
unction of experimental uncertainty. Unlike in the
osner task and the attention-shifting task, both ACh
nd NE manipulations should affect performance in this
eneralized task in a quantifiable manner. Moreover, we
uggest that ACh and NE interact in an intimate and
omplex manner, whereby expected uncertainty, as
ignaled by ACh, gates the effectiveness of NE in con-
rolling representational learning. One intriguing predic-
ion of this part-antagonistic, part-synergistic interac-
ion is that impairments due to abnormal functioning of
ne system (as in various prevalent neurological dis-
ases) may be alleviated by interventions affecting the
ther system, as demonstrated by our simulation of
sychopharmacological manipulations in the model.
xperimental Procedures
e first introduce the formal model of the generalized attention
ask incorporating both expected and unexpected uncertainties,
ollowed by an approximate inference/learning algorithm that uti-
izes ACh and NE as uncertainty signals. We then describe how the
osner task and the maze navigation task are simulated as special
ases of this generalized framework. The mathematics used below
s covered in most textbooks providing an introduction to Bayesian
robability theory (Jaynes, 2003; MacKay, 2003).
he Generalized Task
n trial t, the animal is presented with a set of h binary sensory
ues ct = {c1,…, ch}t, followed by the presentation of a target stimu-
us St. For simplicity, and in accordance with typical experimental
esigns, we assume that each of the cue stimuli, as well as the
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689target stimulus, takes on binary values (0 or 1, representing for
instance left versus right). We also suppose that the animal is equ-
ipped with a generic internal model with the following properties:
P(St|ct; mt = i,g) = { gt if St = (ci)t1− gt if St ≠ (ci)t (2)
Tji ≡ P(mt = i|mt−1 = j) = { t if i = j(1− t) / (h− 1) if i ≠ j (3)
p(gt|gt−1, mt,mt−1) = { d(gt− gt−1) if mt = mt−1U[gmin,gmax] if mt ≠ mt−1 (4)
P({ci}t = 1) = 0.5 ∀ i,t (5)
where P() denotes the probabilistic mass of a variable, p() denotes
the probabilistic density, U[a,b] denotes the uniform distribution
over the continuous interval [a,b], and δ() is the dirac-delta function.
Equation 2 says whether the target St at time t takes on the value
0 or 1 (e.g., left or right) depends only on the value of cue input ci
(e.g., one of the many colored cues) and not on any of the other
h − 1 cue stimuli {cj}jsi, where the cue identity i is specified by
the value of the contextual variable t = i, and the cue validity is
determined by the context-dependent parameter γt = P(St = (ci)t).
Equation 3 says that the context  evolves over time in a Markov
fashion and that the frequency of context change depends on
τ2[0,1]. For instance, a high self-transition probability τ z 1 im-
plies that the context (cue identity) tends to persist over many pre-
sentations: 1 = 2 = 3 = …. Equation 4 describes the way γ
evolves over time: when the context variable changes (t s t−1),
γt also switches from γt−1 to a new value drawn from a uniform
distribution bounded by γmin and γmax (without loss of generality,
assume γminR 0.5 for positive correlation); it is otherwise constant
over the duration of a particular context (γt = γt−1 if t = t−1). In
addition, each (ci)t is independently distributed, with probability
0.5, for being either 0 or 1 (e.g., pointing left or right).
During the experiment, the animal must decide how to allocate
attention to the various ct in order to predict St, as a function of the
probable current context t, which depends on the whole history of
observations Dth {c1, S1,…, ct, St}. This is a difficult task, since on
any particular trial t, not only can the relevant cue incorrectly pre-
dict the target location with probability 1 − γt, but about half of all
the h − 1 irrelevant cues can be expected to predict the target
correctly by chance! In addition, the inherent, unsignaled nonsta-
tionarity in the cue-target relationship creates difficulties. For in-
stance, when the presumed cue appears to predict the target loca-
tion incorrectly on a particular trial, it is necessary to distinguish
between the possibility of a one-off invalid trial and that of the ex-
perimenter having changed the cue identity. Formally, the underly-
ing problem is equivalent to computing the joint posterior:






P(mt = i|mt−1 = j) *
∫p(gt|mt = i,mt−1 = j,gt−1)P(mt−1 = j,gt−1|Dt−1)dgt−1 (6)
where Zt is the normalizing constant for the distribution. The mar-
ginal posterior probability P(mt|Dt) = EP(mt,gt|Dt)dgt gives the current
probability of each cue stimulus being the predictive one.
Equation 6 suggests a possible iterative method for exactly com-
puting the joint posterior, which would constitute an ideal learner
algorithm. Unfortunately, the integration over γ in the joint posterior
of Equation 6 is computationally and representationally expensive
(it is required multiple times for the update of P(t = i, γtrDt) at
each time step, once for Zt, and once for each setting of t in the
marginalization). Given the history of t observations, the true con-
textual sequence could have had its last context switch to any new
context during any of the past t trials, some more probable than
others depending on the actual observations. Crudely, doing the
job “perfectly” on trial t requires entertaining all different combi-
nations of cue and validity pairs as possible explanations for the
current observation (c , S ), based on all past observations. Thist titerative computation, as each new cue-target pair is observed, un-
derlies the chief obstacles encountered by any biologically realistic
implementation of the ideal learner algorithm.
ACh/NE-Mediated Approximate Learning Algorithm
In most natural environments, contexts tend to persist over time so
that the relevant cue-target relationship at a certain time also tends
to apply in the near future (τz 1). Thus, animals may be expected
to do well by maintaining only one or a few working hypotheses at
any given time and updating or rejecting those hypotheses as fur-
ther evidence becomes available.
We propose one realization of such an approximation, which re-
lies on ACh and NE to report computational quantities appropriate
for their proposed semantics of expected and unexpected uncer-
tainties. The idea is to approximate the posterior distribution P(t =
i, γirDt) with a simpler distribution P* that requires the computation
and representation of only a few approximate variables: the most
likely context mt
∗= i, the currently pertaining cue validity gt
∗, the con-
fidence associated with the current model lt
∗h P* (mt = mt
∗|Dt), and
an estimate of the number of trials observed so far for the current
context lt
∗. To reconstruct the full approximate posterior, we assume
P* (mt = js i|Dt) = (1 − λt∗)/(h − 1) (i.e., uniform uncertainty about all
contexts other than the current one i), and the correlation parame-
ters associated with all j s i to be γ0, a generic prior estimate for
γ. We suggest that ACh reports 1 − gt∗ and NE reports 1 − lt∗. 1 −
gt
∗ is the expected disagreement between (ci)t and St and is there-
fore appropriate for ACh’s role as reporting expected uncertainty.
1 − lt
∗ is the “doubt” associated with the current model of the cue-
target relationship. It can be interpreted as a form of unexpected
uncertainty, appropriate for NE signaling, since 1 − lt
∗ is large only
if many more deviations have been observed than expected, either
due to a contextual change or a chance accumulation of random
deviations.
Iterative computation of this approximate joint posterior is tracta-
ble and efficient. If the target St appears in the location predicted
by the assumed cue (ci)t−1, where mt−1
∗ =i, then the current context-
ual model is reinforced by having made a correct prediction, lead-




∗ ≡ P∗(mt = i|Dt) =
P∗(mt = i,ct,St|Dt−1,gt∗)
P∗(mt = i,ct,St|Dt−1,gt∗)+P∗(mt ≠ i,ct,St|Dt−1,gt∗)
(7)
where
P∗(mt = i, ct, St|Dt−1, gt∗) = gt∗(lt−1∗ t+(1−lt−1∗ )(1−t)/(h−1))
P∗(mt ≠ i,ct,St|Dt−1,gt∗) ≈ 0.5(lt−1∗ (1−t) + (1−lt−1∗ )t)
and the approximation of 0.5 comes from the observation that, on
average, half of all the cue stimuli on a given trial can appear to
“predict” the target St correctly, when h >> 1. The optimal estimate
of the cue identity remains the same in this case (mt
∗ = mt−1∗ ,
lt
∗ = lt−1∗ + 1), and the estimated correlation parameter gt∗ also in-
creases to reflect having observed another instance of a concur-




#trials in current context
= gt−1∗ + (1−gt−1∗ )/lt∗. (8)
If St ≠ (ci∗)t−1, then there is a need to differentiate between the
possibility of having simply observed an invalid trial and that of the
context having changed. This requires comparing P∗(mt = i|Dt, gto)
and P∗(mt ≠ i|Dt, gto), where gto = gt−1∗ −gt−1∗ /(lt−1∗ +1) would be the
new estimate for g∗, if the context were assumed not to have
changed. This is equivalent to comparing the following two quan-
tities:
P∗(mt = i, ct, St|Dt−1, gto) = (1−gto)(lt−1∗ t+(1−lt−1∗ )t/(h−1)) (9)
P∗(mt ≠ i, ct, St|Dt−1, gto) ≈ 0.5(lt−1∗ (1 − t)+(1−lt−1∗ )t) (10)
where the approximation comes from the same h >> 1 assumption
as before. Contextual change should be assumed to have taken
Neuron
690place if and only if the quantity in Equation 10 exceeds that in 1
cEquation 9, or equivalently, if we assume τ z 1 and h >> 1,
γ
0.5(1− l∗) > (1− g∗)l∗ (11) t
N
Setting ACh = 1 − γ* and NE = 1 − λ*, and rearranging the terms, m
we arrive at the expression in Equation 1. d
In addition to Equation 11, we assume the system may be alerted h
to a contextual change if the ACh signal exceeds a certain thresh- t
old (1 − γmin being a natural choice here). That is, we assume that (
under extreme circumstances, ACh can alert the system to a con-
textual change, even in the absence of NE activation. This is an i
assumption that needs further empirical verification. V
Once a context change is detected, we assume that the animal m
waits a few “null” trials (ten in our simulations) to come up with an t
initial guess of which stimulus is most likely predictive of the target. c
When an initial guess of the context is made after the “null” trials, f
lt
∗ and gt
∗ are initialized to generic values (λ0 = 0.7 and γ0 = γmin in l
the simulations), and lt
∗ is set to 1. t
To gauge the performance of this approximate algorithm, we a
compare it to the statistically optimal ideal learner algorithm and a f
simpler, bottom-up algorithm that ignores the temporal structure of F
the cues. The algorithm thus uses the naive strategy of ignoring all t
but the current trial for the determination of the relevant cue. On a
given trial, the truly relevant cue takes on the same value as the i
target with probability γ (and disagrees with it with probability a
1 − γ). Having observed that n of the cues agree with the target, e
the predictive prior assigned to each of these n cues, using Bayes i
theorem, is t
a
P(mt+1 = i|(ci)t = St, n) =
g0
ng0 + (h− n)(1− g0)
(12)
T
Twhere γ0 = 0.75 is a generic estimate of γ independent of observa-
ttions made so far (since we assume the bottom-up algorithm does
onot take any temporal structure into account). And the probability
cassigned to each of the other n − h cues, which did not correctly
spredict the target on the current trial, is
0
o
P(mt+1 = i|(ci)t ≠ St, n) =
1− g0
ng0 + (h− n)(1− g0)
(13) b
t
Then the predictive coding cost , which re- f
wards high probability assigned to the true cue t+1 on trial t + 1 c
based on observations up to trial t, and punishes low probability m
assigned to it, can be computed as t
e
e
AFigure 8 compares the performance of this naive algorithm with
the performance of the exact ideal learner algorithm and the pro-
Wposed approximate algorithm, while varying the cue validity γ. In
Cthe simulation, each session consists of 500 trial contextual blocks
Gof different γ values (ranging from 0.5 to 1), that are arranged in a
Mrandom order, and the error bars indicate standard errors of the
fmean estimated from 40 such sessions. All algorithms perform
Gmore proficiently as cue validity increases. The quality of the ap-
proximate algorithm closely tracks that of the exact algorithm, and,
for cues that are actively helpful (γ > 0.5), significantly outperforms R
the bottom-up model. The somewhat better performance of the R
bottom-up algorithm at γ > 0.5 reflects the fact that, because the Aγ > 0.5 block is typically proceeded by another block with higher P
cue validity and the context switch is not signaled, this bias for a
previously favored cue persists into the current block in the face of
Rinsubstantial evidence for another cue being predictive, thus de-




In spatial cueing tasks such as the Posner task, the subjects re-
Aspond more quickly or more accurately on trials in which the cue
avalidly predicts the target location than on invalid trials. The differ-
Tence, measured in either reaction time or accuracy, is termed valid-
ity effect (VE), and it increases with cue validity (Bowman et al., A993). We model VE abstractly as being proportional to the total
onfidence about the target after observing a set of cues ct : VE f
*λ*. γ* and λ* are obtained by simulating the special case of the
ask above, where t is constant throughout the whole session.
ote that the minimal model we are presenting does not actually
odel neuronal dynamics, and therefore our abstract model of VE
oes not explicitly model reaction times. Elsewhere, we investigate
ow neuromodulators may control behavioral measures in atten-
ional tasks by explicitly influencing dynamic sensory processing
Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Within our framework, low perceived cue validity, whether reflect-
ng true validity or abnormally high ACh, results in relatively small
E; conversely, high perceived cue validity, possibly due to abnor-
ally low ACh, results in large VE. The scaling and the spacing of
he experimental and simulated plots in Figure 3 should not be
ompared literally, since empirically, little is known about how dif-
erent doses of ACh drugs exactly translate to cholinergic release
evels, and theoretically, even less is known about how ACh quanti-
atively relates to the level of internal uncertainty (for simplicity, we
ssumed a linear relationship). Moreover, the wide disparity in VE
or the control conditions (drug concentration equal to 0 mg/kg) in
igures 3A and 3B forces a cautious interpretation of the y axis in
he experimental plots.
There is evidence to suggest that overtrained subjects such as
n the modeled experiment, compared to naive subjects, behave
s though the cue has high validity (probability of being correct)
ven when it does not (Bowman et al., 1993). Instead of complicat-
ng our model by accounting for overtraining and possible automa-
icity, we compensate for this effect by simulating the cue validity
t 80% rather than the 50% used in the experiment.
he Maze Navigation Task
he maze navigation task is simulated by exposing the “subject”
o five sessions of c1 being the predictive cue and then 18 sessions
f c2 being the predictive cue, with each session consisting of five
onsecutive cue-target observations, just as in the experiment. The
elf-transition probability of the contextual variable is set to τ =
.9999, so that on average a context change can be expected to
ccur about once every 10,000 trials. The cue validity γt is 95% for
oth contextual blocks. It is slightly less than 100% to account for
he fact that there is always some perceived inaccuracy due to
actors outside experimental control, such as noise in sensory pro-
essing and memory retrieval. “Reaching criterion” is modeled as
aking no mistakes on 2 consecutive days, more stringent than in
he experiment, to account for motor errors (and other unspecific
rrors) rats are likely to make in addition to the inferential errors
xplicitly modeled here.
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